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Abstract 
The nature of project finance is risk allocation. Effective risk allocation can improve project performances. The rule of effective 
risk allocation in project finance is that risk is mostly allocated to the participants whose risk tolerance is high. However, during 
the risk allocation of actual project finance, the participants’ degree of risk tolerance is very abstract and difficult to be measured. 
According to the elements of risk allocation, the method and procedure of risk allocation is put forward in this study based on the 
rule of risk allocation in project finance. The rule and method of risk allocation proposed in this paper could serve as a guide for 
the development of project finance on theory and practice in China. 
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1. Introduction 
Project finance, a new and important technique for financing long-term funds for large-scale and capital-intensive 
projects, has been widely used in the world in industries of electric power, telecommunication, mining and natural 
resources, petroleum and petrochemicals, infrastructure and other fields. Its main benefits are based on its strong 
risk diversification and risk isolation that can increase the possibility of the success for a project. Project finance is 
perhaps best understood in terms of a risk strategy which reconciles the potentially conflicting objectives of 
borrowers and lenders by utilizing the long-term economic and commercial linkages which exist between the 
sponsors, lenders and third party participants involved with a project—the so-called community of interests [1]. 
The nature of project finance is risk allocation because successful project finance would face its challenges via 
the allocation of risks, the development of strategic alliances and the proper risk exposures involved in the 
management of financial projects. In theory, the basic principle of risk allocation for the project finance is 
“Allocating all project risks to the most suitable participant whose risk preference is higher” [2]. In fact, the risk 
allocation is also based on the bargaining power to negotiate a contract of different participants, which would 
occupy most of the time spent on a contract. Comparing a sort of risk that a participant has to bear, the price 
involved in the negotiations of a contract becomes a relatively secondary importance. 
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2. The rule of effective risk allocation in project finance 
The rule of effective risk allocation comes from Christian Gollier [3]. Project finance participants have different 
characteristics expressed by θ, where θ belongs to participants set, Θ. The distribution function of θ is expressed by 
H. θ, the characteristics of participants, affects their preferences preferred by the utility function u (w, θ), where w 
represents the amount of revenue received by the participants to take risks. The assumption is that u is the increasing 
function and concave function of w. The project is facing risk x which may be in a variety of state and X represents 
the state of risks set. For the distribution of state x X, there is a unanimously agreed cumulative distribution 
function F, then, x~ represents a random variable and its cumulative distribution function is F. 
z(x) represents the revenue of the project under the influence of risks x and its cumulative distribution function is 
represented by G(z) that is received from the following distribution: 
( )
( ) ( )
z x z
G z dF x≤= ∫                
(1) 
So that w (z, θ) becomes the revenue gained by the participants θ under the circumstance that the project risk x 
impacts income z, which describes a configuration of such economics. It is a quantity gained in the state x by the 
participants characterized by θ and a function describing the rule of risk allocation. When w (z, θ) is independent of 
z, the θ representing participants is fully insured in respect to z~ . More generally speaking, the sensitivity of varying 
from w to z measures the risk undertaken by the type of θ. In this configuration, the participants’ θ enjoys the 
expected utility as follows:  
( ( , ), ) ( ( , ), ) ( )Eu w z u w z dG zθ θ θ θ= ∫%                
(2) 
One possible configuration w(.,.) is Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible configuration which can increase 
the expected utility of at least one category of parties without reducing the expected utility of other parties. Now, 
let’s consider the positive function λ: Θ→R+ and the corresponding maximization problem: 
(.,.)
( ) ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( )
w
maxE u w z u w z dG z dHλ θ θ θ λ θ θ θ θ= ∫∫% % %%                
(3) 
s.t.  ( , ) ( )w z dH zθ θ =∫   z∀                
(4) 
Any solution planned above is a configuration of Pareto efficient in risk allocation. The function v is defined as: 
( ,.)
( ) ( ) ( ( , ), ) ( )
w z
v z max u w z dHλ θ θ θ θ= ∫                
(5) 
s.t.  ( , ) ( )w z dH zθ θ =∫                
(6) 
Under the constraints of (4), the issue (3) depending on the solution of z is w, the rule of risk allocation to 
maximize ( ) ( ) ( )Ev z v z dG z= ∫% . In terms of describing a configuration of Pareto efficient in risk allocation, the 
obtaining of the optimal solution planned as (5) for all z would be sufficient. For the issue (5), its first-order 
conditions are written as: 
)()),,(()( zvzwu ′=′ θθθλ                
(7) 
Among which u′  is the derivative for u in relation to consumption, implying the following conditions:  
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A Pareto efficient configuration results in the same marginal rate of substitution in any state to all parties. The 
full derivative of first-order conditions directly implies: 
( ( , ), )( , )
( )v
w T w zz
z T z
θ θθ∂ =∂                                                                                                                                     (9) 
Among which, ( , ) ( , ) / ( , )T w u w u wθ θ θ′ ′′= −  and ( ) ( ) / ( )vT z v z v z′ ′′= −  are respectively the index of absolute risk 
tolerance for (., )u θ  and v(.). It shows that the participants’ θ must be allocated to share the risk ratio that is 
proportional to their absolute risk tolerance of the cost. The greater risk tolerance, the greater risk ratio must share. 
Its feasibility of constraints implies: 
( , )wE z 1
z
θ∂ =∂
%                
(10) 
The combination of conditions (9) and conditions (10) means: 
( ) ( ( , ), )vT z ET w z θ θ= % %                                                                                                                                        (11) 
Then, the rule of risk allocation can be drawn as follows: when sharing a Pareto efficient risk allocation, the 
sensitivity to financial changes per capita income the revenue of each party has is equivalent to the proportional ratio 
between a corresponding party’s absolute risk tolerance and the average risk tolerance. 
If the total income is uncertain, those who are not risk-averse people should shoulder a greater share of risk. If 
there are no members of risk-neutral, Tv is limited and all members should take a share of risk. This implies that no 
one can be regardless of risk even if their risk tolerance is lower than the average degree of risk tolerance of the 
whole group. 
3. Basic elements of risk allocation method in project finance 
In theory, those that are not risk-averse participants should assume a larger share of risk. However, during the 
risk allocation of actual project finance, the participants’ degree of risk aversion is very abstract and difficult to be 
measured. Participants’ risk tolerance is not only related to their capacity of resources, understanding level of risk, 
assuming capacity of risk results, organizational risk behaviour and willingness to control risk, but also to the 
controlled extent of risk as well as incentives of risk, etc. All of these constitute the basic elements of risk allocation 
method in Project finance [4]. 
3.1. The main risk controller — who can control the occurrence of risk? 
Effective risk allocation is that risk is mostly allocated to the participants who can highly control the risk. The 
capacity of participants controlling the occurrence or the occurring extent of risk has significant and beneficial effect 
on the potential results of risk in a project. Assuming such risk will inspire participants to take control measures to 
reduce the possibility or influence of risk so that the potential result caused by risk in a project can be prevented. For 
example, the project can be completed under the condition that most of the performance risk is borne by the 
construction contractor based on the premise that the construction contractor can control the occurrence of 
performance risk. 
3.2. The main risk bearer — can related participates bear the risk of the outcome?  
Risk should be allocated mostly to the participants who can provide the best assessment and control of it. 
However, participants must also be considered the ability to take risk. If the risk occurs to affect the responsible 
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party who can not support or even shift to non-selective request or all other means to protect themselves, such an 
allocation is invalid. 
3.3. Willingness to control — who wants to have the risk related environment under control? 
The process of risk management or prevention requires a certain control of the environment surrounded by risk. 
Participants bearing the risk should have a desire to control that risk environment to prevent or manage any risk 
from happening. Participants in the control or the willingness to control such environments are the most capable 
parties of undertaking the associated risks. For example, a participant may wish to access the risk-related sub-
contract work. 
3.4. Control cost — who can manage risk at the lowest cost? 
There is always an associated cost for any risk management, which is simple and practical for measuring the 
influence of risk and the effective management. The minimum cost of risk management is a risk allocation approach 
frequently used. Each participant should be able to identify a risk management cost and the participant who can 
manage risk at the lowest cost should bear such risk. This approach will lead to less cost of a project, creating 
mutual benefit to all participants. 
3.5. Capacity of resources — can related participants manage risk based on their related resources to benefit their 
capacity of risk management? 
Even the related participants can control risk at the lowest cost and ready to bear when risk occurs, their risk 
management capacity and the necessary material resources should be available in a capacity position for risk 
management. Participants to bear risk should be able to access adequate information about risk and can undertake 
the necessary resources into a project and its management of risk. 
3.6. Incentives of risk — can participants be inspired to manage risk in the most efficient and effective manner? 
Participants bearing risk must be inspired to combine the project as a whole and to provide efficient and effective 
risk management. 
3.7. Risk relativity — is there any existence of internal links among the related risks and between such risks and 
others involved in other projects? 
These seven elements imply two aspects to participants to bear risk. Firstly, the capability of controlling risk 
includes 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. Secondly, the effect of managing risk includes 3.2, 3.6, and 3.7. 
Risk allocation must also be considered in respect to the risk of other projects. Projects may have a risk related to 
risks of other projects. Therefore, the joint management or collaborative management, at least, is required to obtain 
the effective and consistent risk management. Different participants responsible for the management of these risks 
need to reach agreement on how to manage these risks together or to allow a party to manage all relevant risks to 
realize more effective result. 
4. Procedures of risk allocation in project finance 
Risk allocation is the process of deciding how to allocate risk and to what extent of allocation. It is related to the 
identification and isolation of each risk, assessment of risk cost and choice of disposal methods, negotiations and 
signing of agreements, etc. The way by which that all project risks are transferred to the project participants is also 
referred to as the “back-to-back” risk allocation. The concession agreement identifies those risks of project sponsors 
while other agreements will have the risks assumed by the project company transferred to other participants in the 
manner of “back-to-back”. 
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4.1. Identifying risk factors 
All possible risk factors of the project risk should be identified. According to whether participants can control the 
risk, the project finance risk can be divided into controllable risks (e.g., project completion risk) and beyond 
controllable risks (e.g., the risk of legal change, etc.). For example, the construction cost overruns becomes an 
important risk of a project finance, and there are many factors contributing to construction cost overruns, such as 
changes in respect to project planning, ground conditions, law changes, etc. 
4.2. Establishing evaluation matrix of risk allocation and selecting representative parties 
On the basis of above basic elements of risk allocation method, we establish evaluation matrix of risk allocation 
to select representative parties. Please refer to the following table for the establishment of risk allocation evaluation 
matrix, depending on the recognized risk factors, and selecting the representative parties. Each table cell has two 
values and the upper left corner represents the controllable capability of risks. Participants who are not controllable 
are referred as “0” while those controllable as “1”. The lower right corner represents the effect on participants from 
related risks or the risk of outcome to be borne and the affected or need to bear risk of outcome is referred as “1” 
while those who are not affected or need not to bear any risk of outcome is referred as “0”. Depending on such a 
comprehensive evaluation of controllable and impact extent, the representative parties are chosen and relevant 
parties are determined. For example, the following risk allocation evaluation matrix is established subject to cost 
overruns of project construction. 
Table 1. Risk allocation evaluation matrix for project finance—cost overruns risk of project construction 
Risk Factor 
 
 
Participants θ 
Project 
Plan 
Changes 
Ground 
Conditions 
Adjustment 
of Contract 
Specifications 
Force 
Majeure 
Law 
Changes 
Imprecision 
of Projects  
 Plans 
Inflation … Total Representative Parties 
Sponsor 1 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0   
1 
1 △ 
Project Company 1 1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1   
2 
8 ▲ 
Contractor 0 1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1   
2 
8 ▲ 
Offtaker 0 0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1   
1 
3 △ 
Banker/Lender 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0   
0 
0 × 
Insurance Company 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
 0 
0 
0 
0 
0   
0 
1 △ 
Host Government 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0   
2 
0 △ 
…                    
Note: “▲” the representative parties, “△”the related parties and “×”non-related ones. 
Based on the evaluation results, the representative party for the risk of construction cost overruns is the project 
company and project contractor.  
The insurance company only undertakes the insurable risks beyond the scope controlled by the project company 
and contractor of construction. The lending bank, in principle, assumes not any risk of construction project cost 
overruns. The host Government may have cost overruns, but bears nothing of the results affected. 
4.3. Estimating cost of risk and selecting treatment options 
The selecting of risk disposal depends on the nature of risk. If a risk can not be avoided, the treatment of 
insurance should be considered and, if insurance can not be adapted, the way of controlling should be maintained 
and, if not uncontrollable, the residual risk sharing should be allocated. 
(1) The expected cost to restore losses by all activities related to risk-associated incident should be estimated. If 
the expected loss is less than or equal to zero, there is no risk of such conditions which do not need any type of 
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security guaranteed. If the expected loss is greater than zero, there is the risk of these conditions then. 
(2) The expected loss and the number of retention are compared. If you have a negative number that needs to be 
guaranteed, the risk can be retained and the method of reducing should be taken. If the risk to be guaranteed is 
positive, risk allocation method would rely on the loss extent and the risk behaviours of an organization. The 
individual or organizational risk behaviours are usually divided into three types as the risk-loving, risk neutral and 
risk aversion. Under the circumstances of higher losses and highly risk-averse behaviours, the best measure is to 
avoid the activities involved in such risks. Other party’s amount of financing is equal to difference between the costs 
of risk incident and the amount the owners are willing to bear. 
4.4. Allocating risk share — allocation agreement negotiations and signing 
In practice, risk allocation is usually a process of bargaining which is difficult to be optimized since any 
participant is far away as much as possible from what they would like to risk and sometimes negotiations would fall 
into blockings. E. Ballestero proposed a model which is a workable compromise solution [5].  
For example, in respect to the risk of cost overruns in project finance, it is usually allocated by signing a turnkey 
contract between the project company and project contractor of construction, among which the determination of 
project cost 0x  is the core of all. For the contractor of construction, 0x  includes the normal profits, the assumed 
risk for completing the project, the risk of cost overruns and the risk premium caused by the uncertainty during the 
project construction phase. If the actual capital cost of x (its distribution function is g (x)) is greater than 0x , the 
project contractor has to bear the loss; If the actual construction cost x is less than 0x , the contractor of construction 
can achieve the normal profits and the exceeding profits as well. As for the project company, the 0x  established 
through competitive bidding can not be set too high. Namely: 
(1) At the time when 0xx ≤ , the contractor of construction can achieve the normal and exceeding profits 
1 0( )x xδ = −  where the expected value is 01 00( ) ( ) ( )
x
E x x g x dxδ = −∫ . 
(2) At the time when 0x x> ，the contractor of construction has to bear the loss as 2 0( )x xδ = −  minus the 
normal profits, whose expected value of 2δ  is 
0
2 0( ) ( ) ( )xE x x g x dxδ
∞= −∫ . 
As the market is full of competition which would cause the contractor of construction satisfied with that if normal 
profits can be achieved, i.e., such a goal for the exceeding profits 1δ  is *1 0δ = . In addition, in order to avoid losses, 
the target for the loss of *2 0δ =  would also lead to a satisfaction. Therefore, according to (1) and (2), a 
compromised model is reached as follows: 
{ } { }0
0
1 2 0 00
min [ ( ) 0] [ ( ) 0] min [ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( ) ]
xh h h h
x
E E x x g x dx x x g x dxδ δ ∞− + − = − + −∫ ∫ , among which, h is an index 
of a compromised model. Projects are generally believed that a contractor of construction is risk aversion and the 
index is ∞=h , so, the type above can be minimized as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
0
x
0 00 x
x x g x dx x x g x dx
∞− = −∫ ∫  
i.e., ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0
0 0
x x
0 00 x 0 x
x g x dx x g x dx xg x dx xg x dx
∞ ∞+ = +∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  and i.e., ( )0 0x xg x dx∞= ∫  
Based on a common knowledge and understanding of the final cost distribution agreed by both the project 
company and contractor of construction, the proposed allocation of the risk of cost overruns can be realized. 
Besides, it should be established in the relevant agreement the incentive mechanism of risk to encourage 
participants who bear the risks to combine the project as a whole to manage risk in an efficient and effective 
manner. 
5. Conclusion 
Project finance is essentially a contract connecting the “community of interests”. Risk allocation is a key aspect 
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of project finance while wrong risk sharing is a dominant cause of disputes. Effective risk allocation can improve 
project performances, such as reducing cost, shortening construction duration, improving the quality of completed 
projects and promoting more active participation in the related working relationship. 
(1) In theory, risk should be allocated to the party whose risk’s tolerance is higher.  
(2) According to the basic elements of risk allocation in project finance, the workable method and procedure of 
risk allocation is put forward in this study based on the rule of risk allocation. 
(3) In practice, it is difficult to optimize risk allocation since any participant is far away as much as possible from 
what they would like to risk and sometimes negotiations would fall into blockings. Thus, a workable compromise 
solution is often adopted in risk allocation. 
In short, this paper offers an extensive guide for the development of project finance from theory to practice in 
China.  
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